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COMMENT
Reconceptualising the study of alcohol policy decision-making: the contribution
of political science
Matthew Lesch and Jim McCambridge
Department of Health Sciences, University of York, York, United Kingdom
ABSTRACT
In this article, we demonstrate the applicability of a 3-I (interests, institutions, and ideas) framework to
alcohol policy research. The analysis uses literature from political science research to provide a core
theoretical framework. To help illustrate the argument, we draw on relevant examples from alcohol
policy in the UK as well as initial findings from an ongoing research study on minimum-unit pricing in
Wales. The Welsh case study provides an opportunity to examine the value of the framework in gener-
ating testable hypotheses in alcohol policy research. We find that several interrelated factors promoted
policy change in Wales, including the government’s power to legislate on matters of public health
(institutionally), a relatively weak alcohol industry (a key interest group), and a public health commu-
nity with specific policy arguments on why and how to tackle alcohol-related harms (ideas). Our ana-
lysis has important implications for public health research and evidence-based policymaking. It
suggests that the uptake of new ideas depends on the existing configuration of interests, institutions
and ideas. This analysis provides alcohol policy researchers with a portable framework for analysing the
policy context.
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Reducing the harms associated with tobacco and alcohol use
have been key priorities for the public health community. In
the case of tobacco, efforts to strengthen international and
domestic laws have been widely successful. The last two dec-
ades have witnessed major shifts in how tobacco is mar-
keted, sold, and ultimately consumed (World Health
Organisation 2017). Several interrelated factors have contrib-
uted to a global convergence of tobacco policy, particularly
scientific consensus about the health risks of tobacco use,
shifting public attitudes toward smoking, and advocacy from
public health organisations (Cairney and Studlar 2014).
Efforts to make progress on alcohol have been
less successful.
The World Health Organization (2010) estimates that the
harmful use of alcohol contributes to about 3.3 million
deaths globally each year. Despite this evidence, govern-
ments have not responded with appropriate policy measures.
Existing research suggests that alcohol industry actors’ activ-
ities have played a key role in resisting evidence-based alco-
hol policies (Jernigan and Trangenstein 2017; McCambridge
et al. 2018). These findings reflect a broader concern about
the gap between scientific evidence and policy (Lorenc et al.
2014; Oliver and Boaz 2019) and the potential role of polit-
ical factors in driving this chasm (Liverani et al. 2013;
Parkhurst 2017).
Engagements with distinct research traditions may help
close the evidence-policy gap (Oliver and Boaz 2019). To
this end, some public health researchers have turned to the-
oretical traditions from political science (Frohlich et al.
2004; Breton and De Leeuw 2011; Smith 2013; Smith and
Katikireddi 2013; De Leeuw et al. 2014; Harris et al. 2014;
Fafard 2015; Baum et al. 2018). Researchers have drawn on
different approaches, including new institutionalism (Harris
et al. 2019), policy subsystems (Harris et al. 2014), and pol-
icy networks (Shearer et al. 2016). Others have used the
three dominant theories of the policy process – Multiple
Streams Framework (MSF), Punctuated Equilibrium Theory
(PET) and Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (John
2003; Real-Dato 2009) – and applied these to public health
policies (Breton and De Leeuw 2011; Baum et al. 2018;
Harris et al. 2018). These works reflect a concerted effort to
use political science (Gagnon et al. 2017) to uncover ‘the
determinants of policy choice’ (De Leeuw et al. 2014, p. 3).
In this article, we look to extend this engagement by
turning to an alternative framework for studying alcohol
policy. Unlike previous work, the focus is not on applying
theories of the policy process (Breton and De Leeuw 2011;
Baum et al. 2018; Harris et al. 2018). Instead, we outline a
more general framework that introduces alcohol researchers
to the building blocks of political science research: interests,
institutions and ideas.
The 3-I framework develops the interrelationships
between 1) interests (i.e. actors and power), 2) institutions
(i.e. rules, processes and context), and 3) ideas (i.e.
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beliefs and values) in explaining political phenomena.
Causal explanations in political science often draw on
interest-based, institutional or ideational arguments
(Pontusson 1995; Hall 1997; Lieberman 2002; Hay 2004).
Here we emphasise the value of recognising synergies
between these factors; the interplay between interests, insti-
tutions and ideas for analytic purposes. This is not the first
analysis to suggest these factors matter or are interrelated
(Heclo 1994; Hall 1997). Following other health policy ana-
lysts (Lavis et al. 2002; Bashir and Ungar 2015; Shearer et al.
2016; Schram 2018), we propose that employing the 3-I
framework can provide alcohol researchers with a more
sophisticated understanding of how politics shapes the policy
process. To our knowledge, this is the first effort to apply
this framework to alcohol policy.
We begin by reviewing the secondary literature that
informs the conceptual approach. In the theoretical discus-
sion, we also point to existing empirical research to provide
illustration of the 3-I framework. Next, we use preliminary
findings from a case study, the adoption of minimum-unit
pricing (MUP) in Wales, to further support the argument.
Data for the case study is drawn from secondary literature,
primary documents, and newspaper articles. Newspaper
articles were collected using the Nexis database. We searched
UK and Wales media sources to trace the MUP debate
between 2010 and 2017. This helped construct a narrative of
the case, allowing us to draw some inferences and identify
testable hypotheses for future research.
Alcohol, public health, and policy
Alcohol poses a range of public policy challenges for society.
As such, there has been a concerted effort to document the
global scale of alcohol’s health-related harms (Babor and
Robaina 2013). The more alcohol is consumed, the more
harm should be expected. Such a relationship is robustly
observed across populations and for a wide range of health-
and non-health related harms (Babor et al. 2010).
Researchers have long recognised the importance of public
policy in addressing alcohol-related harm. As Burton et al.
(2017) summarise, harms from alcohol are primarily a func-
tion of a small number of key determinants. These are
affordability, availability (i.e. ease of access), and social
norms (i.e. acceptability). A wealth of international evidence
suggests that limiting the availability (e.g. outlet density),
increasing price (e.g. taxation), and to a lesser extent
restricting promotion (e.g. advertising) are the most effective
policy tools in curbing alcohol-related harm (Babor et al.
2010; Burton et al. 2017; World Health Organization 2019).
Yet many governments have failed to adopt these policy
measures, suggesting key impediments inhibit the uptake of
these ideas.
The alcohol industry has a vested interest in how govern-
ments respond to alcohol-related harms (McCambridge,
Hawkins, et al. 2014; McCambridge, Coleman, et al. 2019).
Yet this conflict of interest is rarely acknowledged by gov-
ernments (McCambridge, Kypri, et al. 2019; Hawkins and
McCambridge 2020). Changes to tobacco policymaking are
relevant and instructive. Tobacco companies are no longer
treated as legitimate public health policy actors. Under the
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) Article
5.3, signatory governments are forbidden from engaging
with tobacco companies in designing tobacco control poli-
cies. Yet alcohol industry actors are routinely consulted and
regularly form partnerships on policy priorities (Hawkins
and McCambridge 2020). This might be important to under-
standing how industry actors exercise their power. But it is
also necessary to consider how far industry influence in pol-
icymaking accounts for the speed of alcohol policy develop-
ment, and what other factors may be involved. The existing
alcohol policy research has not extensively theorised the pol-
icy process or tested the effectiveness of specific industry
strategies on policy decision-making in particular contexts.
Political science approaches to explaining policy
development
Understanding why governments make specific policy
choices about alcohol is fundamentally about power and
thus requires political analysis. Alcohol researchers have
used political science concepts including framing of ideas
(Chong and Druckman 2007) and policy windows (Kingdon
1995) to explain alcohol policy developments. The focus of
this research, however, has tended to be on the alcohol
industry and its efforts (McCambridge et al. 2018). Less
weight in existing analyses has been given to the influence
of institutional factors in mediating or moderating the
industry’s success; interest-based analyses, in particular, pre-
dominate. The remainder of this section describes each
aspect of the 3-I framework as well as introduces their inter-
relationships. For clarity, though, the section begins by
introducing these factors individually.
Interests
Interest-based accounts focus on actors’ policy preferences
and the power to secure those aims. Organised interests
tend to be the prevailing focus of these analyses. Actors rec-
ognise their common material interests and mobilise their
resources to attain their preferred ends. The capacities of
organised interests to achieve these goals hinge on what
power they possess, including what resources they can bring
to bear on those with decision-making power.
Interest-based analyses tend to focus on the dispropor-
tionate power of business in shaping policy outcomes.
Corporate interests have been shown to have powerful influ-
ences on policy, especially in cases where issue salience is
low (Culpepper 2010; Hacker and Pierson 2011). The rea-
sons for this are two-fold: first, business interests enjoy dis-
proportionate access to decision-makers (Young and Everitt
2005; Hacker and Pierson 2010). Second, elected officials
have incentives to be responsive to corporate interests
(Schattschneider 1960; Wilks 2013), particularly given the
growing complexity of public policy issues and perennial
concerns about economic growth (Fuchs and Lederer 2007).
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Existing work on the alcohol industry finds that corporate
actors mobilise their resources to coordinate political strat-
egy (McCambridge, Coleman, et al. 2019). The alcohol
industry is made up of several different constituent parts
(i.e. drink type, producer, and retailer), meaning that policy
preferences can vary depending on the policy in question
(Holden et al. 2012). One common means of co-ordination
is through the creation of trade associations (Holden and
Hawkins 2013) and social aspect organisations (SAOs),
which promote industry framing of ideas and advance
shared interests (Mialon and McCambridge 2018) in
other ways.
Industry actors seek to advance their interests in policy
institutional contexts and in the realm of ideas more
broadly. Alcohol consumption produces various externalities,
including health damage to the individual and broader social
consequences. Taxation, and other pricing mechanisms, can
be used to address these harms, forcing producers and/or
users to internalise the cost of the behavior. Yet industry
actors emphasise the responsibility of the individual drinker
in generating such externalities (Hawkins and Holden 2013).
The goal is to avoid being seen as responsible, and thus a
possible target for policymakers’ attention. Organised inter-
ests possess the resources and incentives to frame the issues
under consideration by policymakers, though this is done in
competition with other actors, and in the case of alcohol,
these are public health actors (Katikireddi, Bond,
et al. 2014).
Institutions
In the past three decades, institutional explanations have
proliferated in political science. ‘New institutionalism’
stresses the impact of formal rules, norms, and historical leg-
acies on political behaviors and policy choices (Hall and
Taylor 1996; Thelen 1999). As North (1990, p. 3) explains,
institutions can be conceptualised as ‘humanly devised con-
straints that shape human interaction.’ A major contribution
of this literature is that it specifies the mediating impact of a
political system’s institutional characteristics, including the
division of lawmaking authority (Weaver and Rockman
1993; Pierson 1995), on other key variables in polit-
ical processes.
Institutional scholarship comprises four different
approaches: Rational choice institutionalism (RI), historical
institutionalism (HI), sociological institutionalism (SI), and
discursive institutionalism (DI). The ontological assumptions
of these traditions vary but they see institutional context as
consequential for interests (RI, HI), identities (HI and SI),
and ideas (SI and DI) (For reviews Hall and Taylor 1996;
Schmidt 2008). We draw primarily on RI, HI and DI in
the framework.
Institutional characteristics matter for policy because they
determine how decision-making power is constituted and
distributed (Hall and Taylor 1996; Thelen 1999). As RI
approaches demonstrate, the institutional make-up of a pol-
itical system determines the number of veto points in the
legislative process (Tsebelis 2000). These rules of the game
induce policy actors, including organised interests, to adopt
specific tactics and strategies (Immergut 1990;
Pierson 1996).
Institutional analyses are also needed because public pol-
icy decisions are not made in a vacuum. Following work on
HI, institutional perspectives on the policy process stress the
resilience of existing policy arrangements (Pierson and
Weaver 1992). Based on a logic of path dependence, policies
become locked-in. By virtue of history, specific actors (i.e.
interests) and ways of thinking (i.e. ideas) become institu-
tionally embedded and reinforced over time (Pierson 2000;
Jacobs and Weaver 2015). At the same time, a long-standing
critique of new institutionalism is its treatment of change.
Institutional approaches seem better suited to explain policy
stasis and less equipped to explain change (Thelen 1999;
Beland 2009).
In the context of alcohol, institutional access to decision-
makers has often enabled industry actors to influence the
government’s agenda. If industry actors are routinely con-
sulted about policy problems as well as potential solutions,
this offers a key opportunity to protect their commercial
interests. The Responsibility Deal, initiated by the UK gov-
ernment in 2011, offers a clear illustration of how institu-
tional access can bias the direction of alcohol policy in the
industry’s favor (Knai et al. 2015).Thus, institutional
approaches are helpful in understanding some features of
alcohol policy development.
Ideas
Political scientists have also suggested that policymaking
should be conceptualised as a battle of ideas (Beland and
Cox 2011). Ideas can be conceptualised as something much
broader than specific policy solutions; they often involve
more general claims about ‘causal relationships, or the nor-
mative legitimacy of certain actions’ (Parsons 2003, p. 48).
The ACF, for example, highlights the role of shared policy
beliefs in driving collective action. ACF scholars posit that
actors will organise into competing coalitions, where the
beliefs of a winning coalition are expressed in government
policy (Sabatier and Weible 2014).
Ideational scholars have theorised different causal mecha-
nisms, stressing the interplay of ideas and institutions in
promoting change. Through processes of policy learning
(May 1992), actors will draw on new information to update
their causal beliefs about the efficacy of a particular policy
(Dunlop and Radaelli 2018). Ideational processes can also be
less technocratic. Actors can use ideational power (e.g. dis-
course, issue framing) to shape the normative and cognitive
beliefs of other key actors (Carstensen and Schmidt 2016).
Finally, the arrival of new actors with new policy paradigms
is another key source of policy change (Hall 1993; Skogstad
and Schmidt 2011). These works offer clearer insights into
the different mechanisms that underlie major policy change.
Ideational processes play a key role in public health pol-
icy processes, including alcohol policy (Schram 2018). For
example, one idea perpetuated by industry actors is that
while alcohol can be harmful, this concern is restricted to a
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narrow set of problem-drinkers (Bond et al. 2009;
McCambridge et al. 2018). This is at odds with the evidence
(Babor et al. 2010; Burton et al. 2017; World Health
Organization 2019). Industry actors seek to dominate the
information environment within policy-making, framing key
ideas in particular ways, so as to marginalise the scientific
evidence (McCambridge, Kypri, et al. 2014). Industry actors
routinely contest the interpretation and use of scientific
findings in policymaking (Rossow and McCambridge 2019),
and indeed ideas about the relationships between science
and policy (McCambridge, Daube, et al. 2019). It is note-
worthy that in countries where major policy change has
been achieved, industry efforts to misrepresent scientific evi-
dence have not succeeded (McCambridge et al. 2013).
Integrating interests, ideas, and institutions
Policy dynamics should be understood as resulting from
interactions, including frictions, between institutional, idea-
tional and interest-based factors (Lieberman 2002; Beland
2009). Theories of the policy process typically imply these
interactions but do not explicitly incorporate these dynamics
into their models. As Real-Dato (2009, p. 119) argues, the
dominant policy process theories have not come to grips
with new institutionalism, providing ‘limited treatment’ of
institutional constraints. We see synergies between policy
process theories and the 3-I approach, particularly as it
relates to the institutions. For example, in the Punctuated
Equilibrium Theory (PET), the concepts of policy monopolies
and policy images (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) capture the
interrelationships identified by the 3-I framework.
Policy monopolies refer to closed models of policy-
making, where a defined set of policy actors possess de facto
control over a policy area. High levels of policy stability can
be attained by locking-in who participates, as well as what
policy ideas are contested and considered legitimate
(Baumgartner et al. 2009). One of the specific ways in which
control is exerted within a policy monopoly is due to partic-
ipants’ shared understanding of a policy problem. Policy
images refer to ‘how a policy is understood and discussed.’
When a single image of a policy area is widely accepted, it is
remarkably resistant to policy change (Baumgartner and
Jones 1993, p. 25). But policy monopolies and policy images
can also be dislodged via new ideas and new actors (Hall
1993). Those excluded from the policy monopoly often rec-
ognise the impenetrability of existing decision-making struc-
tures and seek out alternative institutional contexts that may
be more responsive to their goals. These contexts provide
those on the losing side (Baumgartner and Jones 1993;
Pralle 2003) with alternative venues to help reframe the pol-
icy image serving the existing policy monopoly. As scholar-
ship in new institutionalism reminds us, however, the
capacity to access these alternative institutions will be shaped
by the internal developments of those structures. The cap-
acity to shift policy images and/or venue shift will be cir-
cumscribed by the institutional context of new settings.
The employment of such concepts is fruitful for under-
standing how specific alcohol policy measures are kept off
government agendas. Institutionalised policy practices, such as
government-industry partnerships, can preclude meaningful
discussion of policy ideas defined as threatening to the indus-
try’s interests. Under such conditions, industry actors may not
depend on lobbying, or other overt attempts to influence
elected officials so long prevailing ideas or policy images pre-
vail. This has implications for how researchers study industry
influence. Rather than looking only at donations or lobbying,
attention could be paid to how industry actors shape how
elected officials define alcohol as a policy problem. Finally, as
illustrated below, new policy ideas with a strong evidence base
can be advanced by a coalition of civil society actors.
Critically, the 3-I framework is not the only way to concep-
tualise the policy process. As noted above, health policy
researchers have already begun to use policy process theories
(Breton and De Leeuw 2011; De Leeuw et al. 2014; Fafard
2015; Baum et al. 2019). These approaches have a lot to offer
(see Baum et al. 2019). They provide compelling insights into
the role of shared beliefs (ACF), policy windows (MSF), and
venue shifts (PET) in shaping policy dynamics. One potential
limitation of employing these frameworks is that they require
specification of scope conditions (Schlager 2007). For example,
the MSF is helpful for understanding how issues get on the
agenda but is limited in explaining political dynamics that
unfold during policy implementation (though for a recent
application to alcohol policy see Hawkins and McCambridge
2020). The ACF is interested in explaining policy change but
over an extended period of time (i.e. 10 years or more). This
means this approach is less attentive to the immediate circum-
stances around adoption of specific policy measures (Schalger
2007), such as MUP in Wales. A key advantage of the 3-I
framework is that it is portable across different stages of the
policy process, making fewer assumptions in so doing.
Moreover, by providing conceptual clarification at a higher
level it enables analysts to approach the study of the policy
process more flexibly. The framework, then, might be particu-
larly instructive when researchers are mapping out the core
features of the case and not testing specific hypotheses derived
from a particular policy process theory.
Another approach surveys the characteristics of policy sub-
systems (Howlett et al. 2009), examining the role of actors (i.e.
roles, values and networks), institutions (i.e. different structural
factors) and ideas (i.e. the content of policy) (Harris et al.
2014, 2018). The benefit of the policy subsystems approach is
that it can enable analysts to apply multiple policy process the-
ories to the same case (Harris et al. 2018). There is consider-
able overlap with this approach and the 3-I framework. In the
3-I framework, however, interests and actors are not treated as
synonymous; actors are taken as relevant across all three cate-
gories. A second difference is the treatment of ideas. In the 3-
I framework (but also see Harris et al. 2018), ideational proc-
esses are treated as broader than the explicit content of policy
solutions (Campbell 1998; Mehta 2010).
The case of minimum unit pricing in Wales
We now draw on initial findings from an ongoing research
study on minimum-unit pricing in Wales to illustrate how
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this conceptual work could be applied as well as inform
future research.
The Public Health (Minimum Price for Alcohol) (Wales)
Bill was passed into law in June 2018. The decision to adopt
MUP is examined here to provide an illustration of how
ideas, interests, and institutions may operate and intersect in
the policy process.
Alcohol has been a long-standing public health concern
in Wales. Welsh policymakers have long been urged to
tackle various alcohol-related harms, including health issues,
public disorder and domestic violence (Government of
Wales 2017). Over the past forty years, Wales has seen a
steady rise in alcohol-related deaths and hospital admissions.
Alcohol imposes a major financial burden on public finan-
ces, with a recent estimate of £76.5 million per year
(Government of Wales 2017). Addressing these harms, as
well as other unhealthy behaviors, has thus formed a key
policy priority since power was devolved to the WNA in
1999 (Porter and Miloudi 2009).
Access to inexpensive alcohol has been identified as a key
culprit in driving alcohol-related harm. Research has demon-
strated a strong link between cheap alcohol and harmful lev-
els of drinking (Stockwell et al. 2012). Governments across
the UK, including Wales, have looked for ways to reduce
consumption of low-cost and high-alcohol content products
(Government of Wales 2017). Research suggests that increas-
ing the cost of alcohol (i.e. taxing it) can reduce consump-
tion (Babor et al. 2010). In the UK, however, taxation is a
power reserved for Westminster.
Governments have other alternatives beyond taxation to
increase the cost of alcohol. In 2008 public health advocates
identified MUP as a potential way to reduce alcohol-related
harm. For the UK’s devolved administrations, the instru-
ment was particularly attractive. MUP imposes a price floor
but does not impose a tax and thus would likely fall under
these governments’ legislative competence.
MUP first gained significant traction within Scotland. In
2012, the Scottish Parliament passed the Alcohol (Minimum
Pricing) Scotland Act 2012 (Katikireddi, Hilton et al. 2014).
A legal challenge by the Scottish Whiskey Association
(SWA) quickly followed, claiming the policy breached EU
competition law (Katikireddi, Bond, et al. 2014). Although
MUP was eventually upheld, the legal challenge significantly
delayed implementation to May 2019.
An important consequence of the policy debate in
Scotland is that it drew the interest of other jurisdictions. In
2012, as part of its Alcohol Strategy, the UK government
announced its intention to bring in MUP, a policy that
would apply to England and Wales. Facing industry resist-
ance, however, the UK government shelved these plans the
following year (Gornall 2014; Hawkins and McCambridge
2014; Nicholls and Greenaway 2015; Gornall 2014). For the
Welsh government, however, Westminster’s U-turn on MUP
presented an opportunity to develop its own MUP
(Rutherford 2014).
In the start of 2014, the Welsh government asked its
Advisory Panel on Substance Misuse (APoSM) to review the
literature on alcohol pricing. The advisory panel reported
back to the government, describing the evidence in support
of MUP as both ‘extensive and reliable’ (Government of
Wales 2017, p. 10).
By April 2014, the government launched a Public Health
White Paper. MUP was described as a ‘proportionate and
preventative action [that could] protect public health’
(Government of Wales 2014). The government defended the
policy referring to the University of Sheffield’s research on
consumption and price (‘Alcohol pricing plans shelved,’
2013). It then commissioned these researchers to model the
impact of different pricing scenarios on various outcomes
(Government of Wales 2014). The results suggested that the
introduction of 50p could save the Welsh treasury £882 mil-
lion annually by significantly reducing illness, crime, and
workplace absenteeism (Meng et al. 2014).
Opposition to both the draft bill in 2015 and legislation
in 2017 was remarkably muted. There were some objections
raised to the bill. Alcohol producers and retailers provided
written submissions and offered testimony during the com-
mittee stage of the bill. In comparison to the MUP debate in
Scotland and England, however, the alcohol industry seemed
far less engaged. One key difference might be the scale of
alcohol production, which is much smaller in Wales
(National Assembly for Wales Rural Development Sub-
Committee 2010). Of the industry groups which opposed
the Welsh legislation, most were London-based alcohol pro-
ducers, retailers or trade associations (National Assembly for
Wales Health 2018). Finally, in contrast to Scotland, MUP
did not divide the major political parties. Only 5 out of 45
assembly members voted against the legislation in Wales,
with UKIP being the only party to oppose the measure
(Jones 2017).
The role of interests, institutions and ideas in the
development of MUP in Wales
One of the more striking things about this case is the rela-
tive absence of the alcohol industry in policymaking. In
comparison to MUP reform in Scotland (Holden and
Hawkins 2013) alcohol industry groups played a much less
prominent role in the Welsh debate. One potential way to
understand the industry’s limited presence is in the broader
institutional and ideational context. The Welsh Assembly
lacks many of the legislative powers other than health that
are directly related to the interests of alcohol industry actors
(e.g. taxation, trade, and criminal justice). Such institutional
conditions can shape the political organisation of inter-
est groups.
In the UK, industry actors have embedded themselves
into the policy context at Westminster (McCambridge,
Hawkins, et al. 2014). Based on the 3-I framework, we
hypothesise that the alcohol industry was less prominent in
the Welsh case because they lacked access to key decision-
makers and departments. In contrast to Westminster, the
Welsh government had never previously legislated on alco-
hol-specific matters. This suggests there were fewer reasons
for the industry to engage directly with the Welsh govern-
ment. Additional data sources will be needed to further
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investigate the nature of industry activity in Wales, and the
extent to which it was shaped by such institutional factors
rather than by the nature of the industry there.
Second, beyond these strategic imperatives, the institu-
tional context can also shape how government actors define
policy problems and solutions, or the prevailing policy
image. In Wales, responsibility for public health is devolved,
while crime and licensing are not. This led the government,
eventually, to adopt the MUP legislation (Connell 2019). In
the Westminster institutional context, however, a public
health framing of alcohol is forced to compete with other
potential framings. A second direction for research is that
devolved responsibility for public health provided favorable
political conditions for public health advocacy and framing
of alcohol-related harms.
Extending this line of thinking, broader institutional
forces can also be seen to have shaped the trajectory of
MUP in the Welsh context. Devolution has resulted in
greater opportunities for policy innovation, providing the
policymaking authority and fiscal capacity to experiment
with new policies. In doing so, devolution also facilitates
policy transfer across the UK (Cairney 2007, 2009). Is MUP
a case of policy transfer in the UK, then? Scotland’s interest
in introducing MUP preceded policy discussions in Wales.
In the Welsh government’s 173-page explanatory memoran-
dum on MUP, the Scottish policy or context is referred to
34 times (Government of Wales 2017). Dedicated research
will be needed to investigate how far Welsh adoption of
MUP can be considered a case of policy transfer. Particular
attention needs to be paid to the underlying mechanism in
so doing. For example, did decision-makers in Wales learn
from their counterparts in Scotland? Or did they simply
emulate the Scottish MUP policy design?
Finally, the idea of MUP itself pervades much of this
case. Two expert groups, the Advisory Panel on Substance
Misuse and University of Sheffield researchers, played key
roles in helping formulate MUP. The former group helped
frame the nature of the policy problem, while the latter
offered recommendations for designing the policy instru-
ment. Clearly, these experts played a key part in the formal
justification of MUP. What is less clear from the existing
data, however, is whether, and if so how and why the work
of these experts persuaded elected officials to ultimately sup-
port MUP. Ongoing study of Wales will test the robustness
of these preliminary conceptually informed observations,
refine the research questions, and may shed new insights
into the nature of alcohol policy decision-making processes,
both in Wales and elsewhere.
Conclusion
Public health researchers have long been frustrated by policy
inertia. There has been growing interest in using political
sciences approaches to help better understand the causes
and consequences of such inertia (De Leeuw et al. 2014;
Mackenbach 2014). In this article, we contribute to this
effort by clarifying and then illustrating how a 3-I (interests,
institutions, and ideas) framework can be used to study
alcohol policy decision-making. The framework provides a
portable set of tools that can be used to study alcohol policy
developments as well as other policy issues in public health.
Research funders have a key role to play in facilitating
this endeavor.
The framework does not offer specific recommendations
for overcoming the political barriers to policy change. It
does, however, hold some important implications. One clear
implication is that reform advocates should choose their bat-
tles wisely. As institutional theory suggests, existing policy
arrangements are highly resistant to change (Thelen 1999).
Rather than attempting to persuade decision-makers and/or
opponents with evidence and argumentation, advocates
might consider a different tactic. Advocates should attempt
to grow their coalition by broadening the appeal of their
preferred policy interventions through re-framing (Mehta
2010). Coalition-building can help undermine the domin-
ance of a prevailing discourse (Schmidt 2008) or policy
image (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).
At its core, political science is fundamentally concerned
with understanding the shape, distribution, and exercise of
political power (Arts and Tatenhove 2004; Hay 1997;
Lasswell and Kaplan 2017). If the ultimate aim of public
health research is to inform the content of policy then
researchers require a clearer conceptualisation of how power
functions in the policy process. The political context needs
to be properly understood in order for power to be used
effectively in the interests of public health. This article has
clarified the range of analytic tools that can be deployed for
such purposes.
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